Research

forthcoming: “Resonance, Alienation, and Cognitive Subjectivism about Well-being” The Journal of Ethics

• A paper arguing that veritism – the idea that the sole fundamental epistemic value is that of truth – is false.
  • currently under review
  • (e-mail for draft)
    
    
• A paper about the phenomenon of unsafe, accidental doxastic justification
  • currently under review
  • (e-mail for draft)
    
    
• A paper about how we can be morally praiseworthy for our epistemic behavior. I also introduce the concept of epistemic sacrifice: forgoing an epistemic good in favor of a moral good.
  • (e-mail for draft)
    
    
• A paper proposing an internalist-friendly version of moral encroachment, the view that epistemic normativity is in part sensitive to non-alethic pragmatic features (moral, prudential)
  • currently under review
  • (e-mail for draft)
    
    
• A paper arguing that there are two species of fundamental epistemic value
  
  
• A paper offering a new argument against some types of epistemic non-consequentialism, in part based on parallels between the epistemic normative domain and the prudential
  • (e-mail for draft)
    
    
• A paper about how epistemic value pluralism can offer new perspectives on the allure of misinformation and conspiracy theories.